University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1977

Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility
and the Judicial Role
Terrance Sandalow

University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/238

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Fourteenth
Amendment Commons, Higher Education Commons, and the Law and Race Commons

Publication Information & Recommended Citation
Sandalow, Terrance. "Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial
Role." In Reverse Discrimination, edited by B. R. Gross. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1977.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

edited by BARRY RGROSS

Ii Prometheus Books
Buffalo, New York 14215

Terrance Sandalow

Racial Preferences
in Higher Education:
Political Responsibility and
the Judicial Role
... Professors John Hart Ely and Richard Posner have established diametrically opposed positions in the debate. Their contributions are of special
interest because each undertakes to answer the question within the framework of a theory concerning the proper distribution of authority between the
judiciary and the other institutions of government•
• . . Professor Ely [see pp. 208-216, herein] defends the constitutionality
of racial preferences, essentially on the ground that the equal-protection
clause should not be read to prevent a majority from discriminating between
itself and a minority only to its own disadvantage. The predicate for an active
judicial role is lacking, ... and, he concludes, resolution of the issue therefore ought to be left to the political process.
Professor Posner ["The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Minorities," 1974 Supreme Court Review 1), on the
other hand, argues that the equal-protection clause should be read to prohibit "the distribution of benefits and costs by government on racial or ethnic
grounds." Ironically, Posner defends this judicial limitation of legislative
Source: University of Chicago Law Review 42 (1975). Reprinted by permission of
the publisher. Notes and citations are omitted in this edited version.
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power in part by arguing that a decision sustaining the constitutionality of
minority preferences would intolerably augment the power of the judiciary
to determine the direction of social policy. Courts must limit legislative
power, as it were, in the service of democratic ideals.
Neither position, in my judgment, adequately confronts the problem of
the judicial role in a democracy. The value choices ••• are inescapable if the
equal-protection clause is to be employed as a measure of legislative power.
Precisely because such choices are essential whenever the clause is used to
limit legislative power, however, appropriate sensitivity to the values served
by democratic decision-making requires courts to defer to legislative judgments unless they clearly transgress constitutional tradition. Nothing in
American constitutional tradition requires courts to deny legislatures the
power to authorize preferential-admissions policies for racial and ethnic
minorities. The validity of such policies depends only upon a judgment that
they serve the public welfare••..
The precise question posed by DeFunis and like cases, however, is not
whether preferential-admissions policies are within the competence of a legislature, but whether they are valid when adopted by a university without
explicit legislative sanction. There is, I shall argue, a significant difference
between these questions, and because of that difference existing racial-preference programs draw no support from Ely's analysis. Although there is
good reason to sustain preferential policies in any event, the grounds for such
a judgment are far less compelling than they would be if the policies had received explicit legislative approval.
1

THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF EQUAL PROTECTION

A decision whether government may adopt a policy of explicitly preferential treatment of racial and ethnic minorities requires a painful choice
between ideals to which American society has developed a deep commitment,
deeper than many of its critics assume. On the one hand, such a policy seems
inconsistent not only with the nation's rejection of racism but with concepts
of individuality and merit that are even more deeply rooted in Western
culture. A rejection of minority preferences, on the other hand, seemingly
threatens both humanitarian and egalitarian ideals which also have deep
roots in Western culture.
• • . The constitutional guarantee of "the equal protection of the laws,"
to begin at such a point, does not mean that everyone must be treated
equally.•.. A prime function of law, indeed, is to mark out the bases for dis-
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crimination by government in its relations with the citizenry.
What the equal-protection clause does require, ••. is that government
treat similarly all those who are similarly situated. But as the literature of
moral philosophy articulates more clearly than the literature of the law, the
principle of similar treatment for those similarly situated-Aristotle's
principle of distributive justice-merely states a formal relationship. Standing alone, it is insufficient to decide any case because it does not indicate how
to determine when individuals are similarly situated. All individuals are
similar in some respects and different in others •••• What is required, ••• is
a material or substantive principle, a standard by which to determine when
the differences among individuals justify treating them differently.
Now the principle of similar treatment of those similarly situated is
merely a prescription for rational behavior and, in that sense, value-free. But
the material principles which determine whether individuals are similarly or
differently situated necessarily rest upon value choices ••. [and] cannot be
made "without positing a certain scale of values, a determination of what is
important and what is not. It is our view of the world, the way we distinguish
what has value from what has none," [C. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and
the Problem of Argument (1963)) that leads us to conclude whether individuals are similarly or differently situated. Controversy concerning the
meaning of the equal-protection clause is a product of disagreement not only
about those values, but about how and by whom they ought to be determined.
When the issue is whether the administration of law comports with
equal protection, the demands imposed by the concept of equal protection
are clear. The material principle is provided by the law. Equal protection
consists of adherence to its terms. If, for example, the law prescribes a 10
percent tax on the income of all individuals, the principle of similar treatment for those similarly situated would be violated by a tax collector who
levied a 15 (or a 5) percent tax only on blacks. The violation does not depend
upon the use of a racial classification (either to the advantage or disadvantage of blacks), but upon the statute's stipulation that income differences
alone are relevant to a determination of the taxes that individuals must pay.
Thus, the principle of similar treatment for those similarly situated would
also be violated if the tax collectors were to levy a tax greater (or less) than 10
percent upon the income of all individuals who have assets in excess of one
million dollars. By stipulating that income differences are the only differences to be taken into account in determining taxes, the lawmaker has ruled
out consideration of other differences, however much it might be wished that
the tax collector were free to consider them. Wealth and race are equally irre-
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levant, not because either is in some sense intrinsically irrelevant to taxation,
but because they have been made so by a particular material principle-the
statute.
The meaning of the equal-protection clause is much less clear when the
validity of legislation is at issue. A claim that legislation denies the equal protection of the laws is an assertion that the legislation treats differently
individuals who are similarly situated. Since the individuals are in fact different and the legislation does distinguish among them, the claim must be
that there is a principle extrinsic to the legislation in virtue of which the affected individuals must be deemed similarly situated. But since that extrinsic
principle cannot be derived from the formal principle of similar treatment for
those similarly situated, the claim musi be that the equal-protection clause
embodies one or more material principles from which it can be determined
whether persons are similarly situated. Yet nothing in the language of the
equal-protection clause suggests the values that ought to be given expression
by a substantive reading of the clause .
• . • The absence of a textual foundation for whatever substantive principles are proposed to be read into those clauses diminishes the likelihood
that the necessary value choices are rooted in constitutional tradition and
thereby weakens whatever claim the judiciary might have for withdrawing
those choices from the other institutions of government. I do not mean to
suggest that a substantive reading of the due-process and equal-protection
clauses can never be justified, but reasonable sensitivity to the values of
democratic decision-making counsels that the courts proceed cautiously in
reading those clauses to limit the choices available to government, especially
the choices available to government in devising remedies for pressing social
problems.
Perhaps because the justification for reading the equal-protection clause
as enacting any particular material principle is so problematic, equal-protection analysis is often cast in terms that appear to obviate the need for such
a principle. The Supreme Court has frequently stated, for example, that
legislation offends the clause if there is no rational basis for the dissimilar
treatment accorded different individuals. The emphasis upon rationality in
this formulation may make it appear that there is no need for a material
principle and, thus, that it is possible to determine the validity of legislation
under the equal-protection clause without making the value judgments that
inhere in such a principle. The appearance is deceptive. A determination
whether there is a rational basis for the legislative classification involves precisely the same inquiry as the determination whether the affected individuals
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are differently situated. It would be irrational to decide differently two cases
that are identical in all respects. But since no two cases are truly identical,
the question of rationality is inseparable from the question of which differences are significant. Whether a legislative classification is rational
depends upon a showing that individuals who are accorded different treatment are differently situated. And whether individuals are differently
situated depends upon which differences are judged important in virtue of a
particular material principle.
Judicial opinions are frequently written, nevertheless, to make it appear
that the "rational basis" test can be employed without introducing an extrinsic material principle, simply by ascertaining whether the disparate treatment accorded individuals is justified by the purpose of the legislation. The
implicit claim is that a material principle is provided by the purpose of the
legislation and that the judicial role is confined to ascertaining whether the
means chosen by the legislature is rationally related to its objective••••
The flaw in this approach is that it cannot explain any decision invalidating legislation without attributing to the legislature a purpose distinct
from that revealed by the terms of the legislation it has enacted. When the
cases in which the approach has been employed to invalidate legislation are
fully analyzed, it is apparent that an extrinsic material principle implicitly
underlies each of the decisions.••.
• . . All legislature that raises equal-protection issues involves an accommodation of competing goals, each of which acts as a constraint upon the
maximization of the others. None of the goals, standing alone, comprehends
the purpose of the legislature, for that purpose is to achieve an optimal
balance among competing goals. The potential multiplicity of legislative
objectives means that it will always be possible to draw from the terms of a
statute legislative purposes to which the statutory classification is rationally
related. The burdens or benefits created by a statute suggest at the very least
a purpose to burden or benefit all those who share the classifying characteristic. The statutory classification must be rationally related to that purpose
because the purpose has been derived from the classification. "Legislative
purpose so defined is nearly tautological••.• " A conclusion that legislation
offends the equal-protection clause cannot, therefore, be grounded solely
upon a determination that the classifications employed in the legislation are
not rationally related to the purpose of the legislation••••
The need for a principle is, however, a good deal more obvious than the
warrant for any particular principle. Although the Supreme Court has in
recent years frequently invoked the equal-protection clause to invalidate
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legislation, it has not carefully considered the problem of justifying the
material principles upon which those decisions rest. Several members of the
Court, led by Mr. Justice Marshall, have urged that material principles can
be derived from values expressed by other constitutional provisions. A majority of the justices have rejected that position but have failed to advance any
other.•.. [A] substantial number of the Court's recent equal-protection
decisions rest upon material principles that cannot conceivably be drawn
from other provisions of the Constitution.••. [W]e lack a substantive theory
of equal protection that would define the interests that the clause protects
and thereby confine its reach•
• . • The desire for such a theory is readily understandable. In its absence, there seems no alternative to resting equal-protection determinations
upon an assessment of the gains and losses resulting from the challenged
legislation, with the judiciary exercising ultimate authority for determining
what is a "gain" and what is a "loss." The opportunity thus conferred upon
the judiciary to substitute its judgment for the legislature's on the relative
merits of competing social goals is, after the past two decades, not simply a
matter of conjecture. Yet, unless the courts are to abandon use of the equalprotection clause as a measure of the validity of legislation, a move toward
which neither the Supreme Court nor its critics seems disposed, weighing the
relative merits of competing social goals is an inescapable element of adjudication. There is no way, apart from choosing among such goals, that the
courts can determine whether those who have received different treatment at
the hands of the legislature are, for constitutional purposes, to be deemed
similarly situated.
Nor is it feasible, over time, to confine the Court's role by adopting a
theory which once and for all specifies the particular values that are to be
accorded protection under the equal-protection clause. Social change is
inevitably accompanied by change in social values..•. The emergence of
new values and the falling away of older ones leads to a continuous redefinition of the categories by which men perceive themselves and to continuous
reassessment of the significance that they attribute to those categories..••
The means by which the Court can accommodate these democratic
values with the need to recognize evolution in the values to be accorded constitutional protection is, of course, the great question of constitutional law, a
question which is not uniquely posed by the equal-protection clause. In the
concluding section of this paper, I want to suggest the beginnings-barely
more than·a hint-of an approach to that question. Before that, however, I
want to show that constitutional tradition does not require that the equal-
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protection clause be read to prohibit state-supported colleges and universities from adopting an admissions policy that accords preferential treatment to racial and ethnic minorities.
2

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION

The "Legislative" History of the Equal-Protection Clause. The framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment plainly did not intend to prohibit the states
from employing a racial criterion to the advantage of the black population.
Posner himself points out that "[s]o bizarre would discrimination against
whites in admission to institutions of higher learning have seemed to the
framers of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment that we can be confident that they
did not consciously seek to erect a constitutional barrier against such discrimination." Nor did they have the broader intention of prohibiting all consideration of race by government. Thus, "it is equally clear," as Posner concedes, "that the framers did not contemplate that the [a]mendment would
compel equal treatment of blacks in public education"-or in a number
of other areas either. The notion lately advanced by the Supreme Court and
repeated by some commentators, that "[t]he clear and central purpose of the
[f]ourteenth [a)mendment was to eliminate all official state sources of
invidious racial discrimination in the States,'' is simply an anachronisman attribution to the framers of the amendment of views that did not achieve
currency until much later.
The idea that black and white are equal, ..• did not begin to gain ascendancy until well into the present century. Ideas that today would be labelled
racist-the word did not exist in the nineteenth century-were during the
nineteenth century the common property of the white population, North and
South, educated and uneducated, slaveholder and abolitionist•.•. [T]he
dominant sentiment of the time accorded race a significance that today, ••.
seems almost beyond comprehension. Racial differences were perceived as
fundamental, enduring and, almost always, reflecting the innate superiority
of the white population.
In the intellectual milieu of the nineteenth century, the dominant
question was not whether the races were different, but the significance of the
fact that they were. During the years immediately following the Civil War,
there was substantial sentiment, centered in the radical wing of the Republican Party, that whatever differences might exist between blacks and whites
were not relevant to their equality before the law.••. But, as the late Pro•
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fessor Alexander Bickel demonstrated in his study of the origins of the equalprotection clause, the radical Republicans were unable to carry their point. A
rule that race was never to serve as a legally relevant category could not have
gained the assent of the country, for it would have opened too wide a gap
between the law and the understanding of the time.
The purpose of the clause was narrower, to gain for blacks equality with
whites in respect of certain rights that were deemed necessary incidents of
their status as free men ..•. Freedom, not equality, was the purpose of the
equal-protection clause.
This "legislative" history does not require rejection of the principle
proposed by Professor Posner; the point is rather that it does not require
adoption of that principle. As Posner suggests, the provisions of the Constitution ought not to be confined to the precise meaning intended by their
framers. But if it is undesirable to be governed by the past, it is worse to be
ruled by a misconception of the past. And only a misconception of the past
leads to the conclusion that it imposes upon government an obligation of
"color-blindness."
... The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment accepted as an overriding
value that blacks, solely by reason of their humanity, were entitled to be
free ..•• But blacks and whites were not perceived as alike in all respects, nor
were all relationships between citizens and government thought to involve the
value of freedom. When freedom and its incidents were not involved, there
were other values, such as the intelligent discharge of civic obligations, in
respect of which blacks and whites were thought not to be similarly situated
and in respect of which discrimination was, therefore, justified. The goals the
framers sought to achieve thus determined for them when racial discrimination was to be permissible. Today, similarly, a decision about whether
racial discrimination is permissible will be determined by what we seek to accomplish.
The Validity of Classification by Involuntary Characteristics. A second
way of justifying a principle is to demonstrate that it can be derived from a
more general and concededly valid principle. The only readily apparent principle from which Posner's principle might derive is the suggestion by several
members of the Supreme Court that classification on the basis of characteristics that are adventitious and immutable is, if not necessarily invalid, at
least constitutionally suspect ••.. It seems unfair that the burdens and benefits of social life, especially those distributed by government, should be
apportioned among individuals on the basis of qualities over which they lack
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control. The denial of schooling to children because of their skin color or sex,
the limitation of public office to certain families, and other familiar examples
from history and literature suggest the force behind that idea. Ideally, these
illustrations might be taken to suggest that distribution of the burdens and
benefits of social life ought to bear some relationship to responsibility and
merit. Yet, prevailing notions of responsibility and merit are intimately
bound up with the opportunity for choice that is denied individuals when
government classifies them on the basis of involuntary characteristics.
Professor Posner disclaims any reliance on this broader principle, however.... The situations are too numerous in which the values of our society
call for attention to involuntary characteristics. Those values may require
efforts to cultivate ••• the use of what are, in part, genetic characteristics, as
when rewards or special training are given to the intellectually gifted or those
of unusual physical prowess. Humanitarian considerations may suggest
special consideration for the needs of those who suffer from an involuntary
disability, say, by devoting a larger amount of resources to the education of
handicapped children than to the education of other children. Surely, none of
these policies would be held by a court to be beyond governmental competence, as recognized even in the opinions that suggest the illegitimacy of
classification by adventitious, immutable characteristics. In such situations, it
is explained, the classifying characteristic is relevant to a legitimate governmental purpose. But that formula, of course, is the test for the validity of all
classifications, not merely those which rest upon adventitious and immutable
characteristics. The accidental, unchangeable character of the classifying
criteria adds nothing to the argument.•••
Hostility to the use of involuntary characteristics to classify people may
have a subtle historical explanation. Classification by such characteristics
has frequently been used to perpetuate the dominant political, economic, or
social position of certain groups. It thus seems reasonable to suppose that
attitudes toward the use of involuntary characteristics have been colored by
the fact that their use has often been at war with the egalitarian ideals that
have dominated the modem age. The influence of egalitarian ideals upon our
attitudes toward sorting people on the basis of adventitious circumstances is
suggested also by the toleration for-perhaps insistence upon-such a
sorting criterion when egalitarian ideals are served thereby. When life itself is
at stake, for example, the fundamental equality of all humans-their equal
dignity and worth-has at times seemed to require that the choice of who
shall live and who shall die be left to chance.••.
Now whatever other objections there may be to the preferences that
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recently have been accorded racial and ethnic minorities, it is obvious that
those preferences do not serve to maintain a position of dominance for the
preferred groups. Not only are the groups given preferential treatment
among the least advantaged in the society in terms of political, economic and
social status, but it is precisely their disadvantaged status that has provided
the primary rationale for preferential treatment. ...
Yet the objection of classification by involuntary characteristics does not
seem to rest solely upon the use of such criteria to serve nonegalitarian objectives. Legislation that excluded left-handed children from kindergarten
would, if unsupported by further justification, undoubtedly be universally
condemned as unjust and invalidated by the Supreme Court as a denial of
equal protection even though the classification neither perpetuated nor
created long-term class consequences. The objection to such legislation
would, I think, proceed somewhat along the following lines: one goal of a
good society is to enlarge the opportunities of individuals to cultivate and
express their individuality, to facilitate each individual's opportunity to
pursue a personal conception of the good life .•.• Distribution of opportunities on the basis of involuntary characteristics is incompatible with that
goal because the claim of each person to pursue his conception of the good
life ought to be given similar consideration. Perhaps individuals who make a
greater effort ought to receive greater consideration, but the fact that one
individual differs from another by reason of race, sex, height, or another
involuntary characteristic seems an insufficient reason for regarding him as
more or less worthy of consideration. If opportunities are in short supply, it
might thus be argued, they ought to be rationed on a basis that bears some
relationship to the goal of enhancing the ability of individuals to develop
their individuality. So, for example, if there are fewer vacancies in universities than applicants for admission, preference might be given to those
applicants whose objectives would best be served by a university education or
to those whose past efforts revealed a more intense desire to be educated.•••
The obvious response to this argument is that ••• [n]o calculus exists for
determining whether one person's or another's objectives would be better
served by access to higher education. Nor are there adequate measures of
relative intensity of desire or means by which to determine the extent to
which differences in past performance are attributable to effort or to factors,
such as native endowment, that are beyond individual control. Measurement
is not the only difficulty, moreover. The relationship between adventitious
characteristics and individual choice is uncertain. Past effort may be no more
than a product of adventitious circumstances, a consequence not merely (and
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perhaps not at all) of individual will but of the family in which one chanced to
be born and of natural endowment which offered promise that effort would
be worthwhile. The same may be true of desire.
Thus, the same reasons offered to justify the conclusion that minority
preferences are unjust may also be offered to support a conclusion that it
would be equally unjust to admit to universities those applicants displaced by
the minority preference: though race and ethnicity are adventitious, and
hence irrelevant to desert, the same is true of natural endowment and childhood environment, important determinants of success on admission tests and
in prior academic pursuits. If use of the former is to be viewed with suspicion
because they ignore desert, it is not obvious why use of the latter ought not to
be viewed with similar suspicion.
Pushed to the extreme, this line of reasoning threatens the premise with
which we began. If individuals are solely a product of forces beyond their
control, it is meaningless to posit as a social goal the enlargement of opportunities for them to develop their individuality. All individual goals, desires
and efforts would be adventitious from the perspective of the unwitting
individual. The determinism that underlies this view has, no doubt, played an
important role in shaping modem attitudes, but it is certain that, in its
extreme form, it does not .command a consensus among Americans. Our
legal system and political institutions, our moral conceptions and even the
language we speak, reflect a belief that individuals make choices, that human
will is a reality.••• If that assumption has at times led to cruelty and injustice, its abandonment seems likely to be even more pernicious•
. • • The principle that classification by involuntary characteristics
counts against the validity of a classification thus rests upon values that are
central to our conception of the good society and therefore of the proper role
of government.
All that has been established, however, is that the use of such criteria
ought to count against the validity of a classification, not that they are always
impermissible. There are numerous situations in which other values may call
for discrimination by involuntary characteristics. At times, for example, the
reward of desert is sacrificed to a social interest in the meritorious performance of certain tasks. Membership on the University of Michigan basketball team is not equally open to all. The men who have achieved it have, no
doubt, demonstrated desire and effort. But no amount of desire and effort
would yield a place on the team to the many individuals who lack the necessary physical attributes. We may regret the inability of the latter to fulfill
their ambitions, even lament that "life is unfair," but the fact remains that
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we prize the ability to play basketball well more highly than the effort and
desire to do so.
Now what is true of the University of Michigan's basketball team is also
true of its law school, as it is of other law schools and of selective-admission
higher-education programs generally.... Desert is thus sacrificed to a
conception of social utility, the perception of a social need for highly competent lawyers and other professionals. If considerations of utility are sufficient to overcome reservations about the use of involuntary characteristics
when competence is at stake, there is no apparent reason why similar considerations ought not to prevail in support of minority-admission preferences.
Unless race and ethnicity are required (for some still unexplained reason) to
be treated differently from other involuntary characteristics, the only question is whether social utility is served by minority preferences.
To the extent social utility is served, race and ethnicity may even be seen
as measures of competence. Competence is the ability to perform a task in
line with certain objectives. Those objectives, in the case of educational institutions, are typically defined with reference to some perception of social
needs. Traditional academic admissions criteria reflect a particular perception of those needs-a need for students who will provide intellectual
stimulation for other students, for lawyers with a high degree of analytic
capacity, for physicians with an understanding of biochemistry, and the like.
Undoubtedly, these intellectual needs are of critical importance and we depreciate them only at our peril. But they are not the only needs of the society,
as educational institutions have occasionally recognized by tempering intellectual standards for admission with the use of geographic preferences. In the
same way, special minority-admissions programs may serve particular social
needs.
It is sometimes argued that even if social utility is served by such programs, they must nonetheless be held invalid because they impose upon the
white applicants who would otherwise have been admitted too much of the
cost that must be incurred to improve the conditions of minority groups. The
fallacy of that argument should now be apparent. The burden upon the
excluded applicant is real, but it is not different from the burden borne by
applicants excluded under traditional criteria. Moreover, it is imposed for
precisely the same reason, a judgment that the public welfare will be better
served by the admission of someone else. In that respect racial and ethnic
admissions criteria do not differ from traditional criteria that are unquestionably constitutional.
The principle that government may not distribute burdens and benefits
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classification by involuntary characteristics is either invalid or constitutionally suspect. ...
Discrimination Against Minorities: The Question of Consistency •.••
. . . [l]f it could be shown that a constitutional role prohibiting classification
on racial or ethnic grounds was necessary to support the line of decisions
invalidating legislation that employs racial classifications to the disadvantage
of blacks, adoption of the principle would be required.... Such a defense of
the "color-blind" principle, if it could be established, would be not merely
persuasive, but compelling. Consistency is not simply a matter of intellectual
elegance as some students of the legal system appear to assume, but rather
the critical test of whether decisions serve a coherent set of values•
. . . [But Posner acknowledges that] "discrimination against whites" is
not "the same phenomenon as the sorts of discrimination involved in previous equal-protection cases involving members of racial or ethnic minorities ... " because of the different social consequences of the current programs of minority preference and the discriminatory legislation that the
Supreme Court has previously invalidated. The latter, served to perpetuate
the dominant status of a preferred group ... in a manner wholly incompatible with the nation's evolving egalitarian ideals. Minority preferences
plainly are not subject to criticism on that ground.
. . . [T)he response ... seems clear: whether or not the distinction
has substance, the Supreme Court is not entitled to consider it in applying the equal-protection clause. A rule of constitutional law, Posner contends, must be "sufficiently precise and objective to limit a judge's exercise of personal whim and preference." A rule that requires an assessment of
the consequences of discrimination in order to determine whether the discrimination is constitutionally permissible would, he argues, lack the
necessary "precision and objectivity" and thus be no more than "a directive
that the judges uphold those forms of racial and ethnic discrimination which
accord with their personal values." ••.
• • • The purely personal references of judges, all would concede, are not
adequate reasons for judicial limitation of legislative power. Something else
is required ..•• The problem of identifying sources that will "limit as well as
nourish" judgment is especially acute in fashioning law under the equal-protection clause .•. Absent a consensus concerning the appropriate sources of
judgment, there is an inevitable risk that judgment will tum upon the
personal preferences of the judges.
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Precisely because that risk is unavoidable, however, its existence cannot
be used ... as a justification for selecting one rather than another material
principle for giving meaning to the equal-protection clause. Value choices
necessarily underlie the selection of one or another principle, and, absent
societal agreement upon either the values or the source from which they are
to be derived, there is no escape from the risk that the principle selected will
reflect values personal to the judge.•••
Posner himself comes close to recognizing this problem when he considers the question whether the principle he proposes "is itself subjective and
arbitrary, because it does not explain why only race and ethnic origin, and
not all immutable or involuntary characteristics" are to be held impermissible bases of classification. His response to that question is instructive.
"There are," he writes, "two grounds of distinction:
The first is one of necessity: if the constitutional principle were defined in terms
of all involuntary characteristics, it would violate the requirement that a constitutional principle bind the judges. Since no one could argue that no involuntary characteristic should ever be used as a criterion of public regulation, the
principle would give the judges interpreting it carte blanche to pick and choose
among groups defined in accordance with one of the involuntary characteristics. Second, the grouping of people by an ancestral characteristic is surely not
the same phenomenon as, say, grouping by sex or age. A rule forbidding blacks
to work in mines, one forbidding women to work in mines, and one forbidding
children to work in mines, may all be discriminatory, but one must strain to
regard them as identical, in the sense that if one is invalid, so, obviously, are the
others.

Neither reason is persuasive.
The second point merely calls upon our intuition that race, sex, and age
differ from one another. Brief reflection will reveal, however, that whether
or not they do depends upon the context in which the question arises. Race
and sex differ from age in that neither of the former, in contemporary
America, would be thought a permissible basis for differentiating among
persons in determining the right to vote or in formulating compulsory schoolattendance laws. Race differs from sex and age, however, when the issue is
liability to compulsory military service: the latter, but not the former, would
generally be considered appropriate bases for classification. None of these
characteristics would be thought a permissible basis for determining liability
to the thumbscrew: all persons would be equally exempt because their common characteristics, for this purpose, would be deemed more significant than
their differences.••. [T]he consequences of employing one or another of the
criteria differ in different contexts, and it is by an appraisal of these con-

Racial Preferences in Higher Education

253

sequences that we determine whether the criteria are permissible bases for
sorting people .
. . . The idea that racial classifications are wholly forbidden by the Constitution apparently took root in the mid-1950s, in the effort to explain a
series of per curiam decisions that extended the rule of the School Segregation Cases to all public facilities. Other principles that would justify those
decisions were, no doubt, imaginable, but in the absence of any explanation
by the Court, a principle requiring government to be "color-blind," as urged
long ago by the first Justice Harlan, was both plausible and attractive.
. . . A principle forbidding government to classify by race would at least
keep government out of so dirty a business and, by depriving it of an apparently vital support, perhaps end it altogether. Other values also seemed to be
served by the principle. Its adoption appeared to promise significant
improvement in the economically depressed condition of the black population, for it would require that governmental benefits, a significant form of
wealth in modem society, be equally available to all, in fact as well as in
theory. An end to enforced separation of the races offered the additional
hope that traditional prejudices would be eliminated as blacks and whites
came to know one another as individuals, a prospect viewed by many as
desirable not only as a step toward realizing the cultural ideal of the
"brotherhood of man," but as a means of further reducing the barriers to the
economic and social advancement of the black population...•
To argue that constitutional principles must be formulated without
regard to goals ignores the fact that it is precisely the consideration of those
goals that suggested the "color-blind" principle. The altered perception of
social reality over the past two decades-and the consequent need to reconsider the priority among our goals-is, indeed, a classic illustration of Perelman's observation that "[a]ny moral, political, or social evolution leading to a
modification in the scale of values will at the same time modify the characteristics regarded as essential for the application of [the principle of similar
treatment for those similarly situated]." It is one thing to maintain that
people are similarly situated, notwithstanding racial differences, when the
consequence of doing so appears to be the alleviation of suffering and the
establishment of an integrated society. It is quite another to do so when the
consequence appears to be precisely the opposite.
Professor Posner is right to point out that there are dangers associated
with a principle that would permit race and ethnicity to be considered if the
anticipated consequences seem desirable. "The necessary inquiries," he
writes, "are intractable and would leave the field open to slippery conjec-
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tures." If this overstates the matter somewhat, the point is nonetheless
important. Judicial freedom to examine the consequences of a racial or
ethnic classification in determining its validity may also yield judgments
disadvantageous to minorities. The risk is unavoidable. Yet it is difficult to
understand Posner's conclusion that the "antidiscrimination principle is ...
more compelling when it is divorced from empirical inquiries into the effects
of particular forms of discrimination on the affected groups." Unless it is
supported by an appraisal of such effects, an antidiscrimination principle is
not even persuasive, let alone compelling. It is not, as we have seen, required
by history, nor can it be derived from a more general principle of constitutional law.
3

THE ARGUMENT FOR A MINORITY PREFERENCE IN
LAW-SCHOOL ADMISSIONS

..• Legislation that classifies children by race to maintain racially segregated schools is impermissible. But classification by race is "within the
broad discretionary powers of school authorities" if "in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society" those authorities wish to adopt a policy
"that each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole." The difference is not in
the criteria employed to classify students, but in the Court's evaluation of the
consequences of the two programs. The one leads to a racially segregated
society, with all that that entails for the welfare of the black population; the
other offers hope of a racially integrated society and of a time when at least
one adventitious circumstance will have been removed as a barrier to the
"pursuit of happiness."
The validity of preferential-admissions policies in institutions of higher
learning, similarly, turns upon a judgment about whether the policies will
contribute to or retard development of the kind of society we want..••
Any justification of racial and ethnic preferences must begin by recognizing that race and ethnicity are socially significant characteristics. Many
Americans, and especially those who are members of the groups that have
been the beneficiaries of preferential-admissions practices, live in communities and belong to organizations that are defined in racial and ethnic terms.
The direction of their loyalties and of their sympathies is significantly determined by their racial and ethnic identifications. Whether, or to what extent,
that is desirable is currently the subject of much debate; but whether it is
good or bad, it is a reality with which the law must contend.•••
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... [T]he question whether blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities
are substantially represented in law-school classes and at the bar assumes
considerable importance. Gross underrepresentation of these groups has
consequences quite different from those that would result from, say, the gross
underrepresentation of men with one blue and one green eye or of lefthanded
women. Individuals who share these latter characteristics do not identify
with one another. Their associations are not significantly determined by their
common trait. They do not share a distinctive cultural background which
may make it easier for them to communicate with one another than with
others. Governmental decisions do not affect them differently than they
affect other persons, and, conversely, their views on issues of public policy are
likely to be distributed in the same way as in the general population. In all
these respects, individuals defined by these characteristics differ from the
members of racial and ethnic minorities. And it is precisely because of these
differences that gross underrepresentation of the latter in law school and the
bar poses a significant social problem.••.
Professor Posner develops at some length an argument that minority
preferences cannot be justified by the desirability of a diverse student body.
"For a diversity argument to be convincing," he correctly maintains, "it
must identify a differentiating factor that is relevant to the educational
experience." The only significance of race, he argues, lies in its strong correlation with other characteristics, like poverty, that arguably are relevant to
diversity in the educational experience. "Race in this analysis is simply a
proxy for a set of other attributes-relevant to the educational process-with
which race, itself irrelevant to the educational process, happens to be correlated." The use of race as a proxy, Posner argues, may be "efficient" insofar
as it reduces the costs of identifying individuals who have characteristics
that are relevant to the educational process, but it is objectionable because it
rests upon and thus "legitimizes the mode of thought and behavior that
underlies most prejudice and bigotry in the United States." If race and
ethnicity may be used as a proxy for desirable characteristics with which they
are correlated, he concludes, the same interest in efficiency which justifies
that use would permit them to be employed as a proxy for undesirable
characteristics, thereby justifying discrimination against minorities.
The error of this argument lies in its failure to appreciate the social
significance of race, quite apart from its statistical correlation with other
attributes. Precisely because race itself is socially significant, students need
knowledge of the attitudes, views and backgrounds of racial minorities.
Posner is right to insist, although he overstates the point somewhat, that
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there "are black people (and Chicanos, Filipinos, etc.) ..• who have the same
tastes, manners, experiences, attitudes, and aspirations" as many whites.
What he ignores is that encountering that diversity is an important part of
the educational process. Well-intentioned whites, no less than bigots, need to
learn that there is not a common "black experience" and to appreciate the
error of such statements as "blacks want (believe, need, etc.)...• " Moreover, the distribution of attitudes among blacks is not the same as it is among
whites. And that too is worth knowing. If the distribution of perceptions and
views about politics, or crime, or family is different among blacks than
among whites, that in and of itself may have important implications for
public policy.
The educational objectives of a minority presence in law school, finally,
encompass more than increased understanding of minority groups. There is
also a need to increase effective communication across racial and ethnic
lines. Many white students, for example, need to learn to be able to disagree
with blacks candidly and without embarassment. I cannot imagine that any
law teacher whose subject matter requires discussion of racially sensitive
issues can have failed to observe the inability of some white students to examine critically arguments by a black, or the difficulty experienced by others
in expressing their disagreements with blacks on such issues. Yet, these skills
are not only a professional necessity, they are indispensable to the long-term
well-being of our society.•••
In a society in which racial and ethnic identities play an important role
in everyday life, a lawyer's racial or ethnic background may have an important bearing on his ability to serve his client. Many of the tasks that lawyers
perform for their clients require an understanding of the social context in
which the client's problem arises. A brilliant and effective tax specialist is, for
that reason, unlikely to be an effective representative in a labor negotiation.
The reason is not simply that he is unfamiliar with the law of labor relations;
it is also and perhaps primarily that he lacks an understanding of the
practical problems of labor relations, of the customs that have developed in
dealing with those problems, and of the style and manners of collective bargaining. To the extent that racial and ethnic groups form distinctive subcultures within our society, the representation of some of their members in
connection with some of their legal needs may involve similar difficulties for
the "outsider." The ability to "speak the language" of the client, to understand his perception of his problem, and to deal with others in the community on his behalf are qualities essential to being a "good lawyer." These
qualifications are more likely to be found among lawyers who share the
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client's racial or ethnic identity, at least to the extent that the client's life is
bound up in a community defined in these terms..•.
Ely's premise is the familiar view that in determining the constitutionality of legislation, courts owe less than normal deference to legislative judgments when the interests of a minority are uniquely threatened. Although he
is seemingly prepared to have the courts subject a legislative judgment to
closer than a normal scrutiny whenever any minority is singled out for disadvantageous treatment, Ely employs the distinction primarily to explain
why courts are justified in examining with special care legislation that
employs a racial classification to the detriment of a minority. The reason, he
argues, is that there is less basis than normally exists to have confidence in
the legislature's assessment of the costs and benefits of the legislation. When
the impact of legislation is broadly distributed through the society there is no
reason to suspect inaccuracy in the legislature's measurement of costs and
benefits. Similarly, when legislation distinguishes between two minorities •••
there is no reason to suppose that the legislature's assessment of costs and
benefits has been inaccurate. When, however, the costs and benefits of
legislation are differentially distributed between a {racial) majority, to which
most members of the legislature belong, and a minority, the legislature's
assessment of these costs and benefits is likely to be distorted. The legislature's exclusive identification with the group to which most of its members
belong, Ely contends, will tend to distort its assessment in two ways: first, by
leading it to overestimate the costs of treating the majority and minority
equally, and, second,. by causing it to undervalue the costs imposed upon
the minority by the differential treatment. Both of these risks are enhanced
by the existence of racial prejudice.
This analysis leads Ely to conclude that there is no reason for a court to
view as constitutionally "suspect" a racial classification adopted by a
majority "so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself." ..•
Ely's analysis and the conclusions he draws from it are troublesome •••
[l]n American politics majorities are rarely if ever monolithic. Typically,
political majorities are coalitions of minorities which have varying interests in
the issue presented for decision. The real dispute is not between a majority
and a minority but between those minorities whose interests are most immediately affected. Resolution of the dispute depends upon which of the
minorities is more successful in forging an alliance with those groups which
are less immediately affected.
The issue whether state schools ought to adopt preferential-admissions
policies is no exception. The immediate beneficiaries of these policies are the
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minorities which receive preferential treatment. But there is no reason to
suppose that the costs of such policies are borne equally by subgroups within
the white population. To the extent that they are not, the discriminationthough nominally against a majority-is in reality against those subgroups.
The fact that the costs of racial and ethnic preferences are not equally or
randomly distributed among the white majority is not, by itself, a basis for
constitutional objection to the preferences. The costs of governmental
policies often fall disproportionately upon subgroups in the society. In the
absence of a constitutional norm insulating a group from that burden, there
is no warrant for judicial intervention. The distribution of burdens and
benefits is the central function of the legislative process.
The legitimacy of the legislative process does not depend upon the disinterestedness of the legislature, as Ely implicitly argues, but upon its political responsibility. Legislatures are, no doubt, not fully responsive to the
wishes of the electorate-nor would we want them to be-but their political
responsibility is crucial to the democratic ideal that governmental policies
ought to respond to the wishes of the citizenry. The legislature's political
responsibility serves that ideal in a number of ways. First, it provides a means
by which government is made more sensitive to the impact of a policy upon
the various segments of the society and thereby contributes to the calculation
of gains and losses resulting from that policy. Second, since an appraisal of
the consequences of policy involves not merely a measurement of gains and
losses, but a judgment of what is to count as a gain or loss and how these shall
be balanced, political responsibility helps ensure that government policy will
not depart too far from the values of the citizenry. Finally, the political responsibility of the legislature creates an incentive for compromise and
accommodation that facilitates development of policies that maximize the
satisfaction of constituents' desires.
It is precisely these legitimating characteristics of the legislative process
that lead to my doubts about the validity of existing preferential-admissions
policies. Those policies are not the product of a politically responsible legislative body, but of decisional processes internal to the universities that have
adopted them. Decisions to employ racial and ethnic preferences have either
been made by faculties or by the governing bodies of the institutions. In
either event, the process of decision and the character of the decision-making
body are very different from those of legislatures, different in ways that ought
to make the courts a good deal less confident about the propriety of those
policies than would be justified if they had been adopted by a legislature.
A law-school faculty, for example, is not well situated to acquire infor-
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mation about the impact of its decisions upon persons outside the law-school
community and the legal profession. Nothing in the relationship of the
faculty to the public makes it likely that the faculty will learn whether a
decision to grant preferences to certain racial or ethnic groups imposes
unduly heavy costs upon other groups in the society or whether there are still
other groups that might plausibly lay claim to a similar preference..•.
Faculties are, moreover, less constrained than legislatures by the need to
obtain public consent for their actions, creating a danger that the choices
they make will depart too widely from the values of the larger society. This
danger is enhanced by the fact that, for all their diversity, faculties are relatively insular communities, subject to distinctive pressures and a tendency to
form distinctive outlooks upon issues. Encompassing less diversity than the
larger population, they are relatively more prone to fall victim to those
enthusiasms and waves of passion that befall small groups and justify
lodging decision-making authority in larger groups.
These considerations need not be a source of concern when, as will
normally be true, faculty decisions are made within the framework of societal
consensus, but they are a good deal more troublesome when, as in the case of
racial and ethnic preferences, a consensus does not exist. The absence of a
consensus is of particular concern because the question whether preferences
shall be used poses major value choices for the society. Minority preferences
may, as I have argued, serve deeply rooted societal values. But there is a risk,
the dimensions of which cannot yet be fully understood, that they will do so at
a significant sacrifice of other values.
One major area of concern is the impact preferential policies may have
upon the relationship among racial and ethnic groups. It may be, as some
have suggested, that "we can have a color-blind society in the long run only if
we refuse to be color-blind in the short run." But there is a danger that the
use of preferences will exacerbate existing tensions in the society, both by
creating resentment against the preferred groups, and by buttressing existing
identifications and loyalties. The current beneficiaries of preferential policies
may have a compelling claim to them, but, given the incentives, other groups
may be expected to come forward with claims that, to them at least, will seem
equally compelling. Since groups that currently benefit from preferential
policies are no more likely than the beneficiaries of other subsidies to relinquish them willingly merely because the needs by which they were originally
justified have become less acute, the claims of other groups to similar preferences are likely to become increasingly justifiable over time. Significantly
heightened racial and ethnic tensions would follow, as various groups in the
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society vied for their "rightful share" of university admissions and other
social goods.
How seriously one takes these possibilities depends not only upon an
estimate of the likelihood of their occurrence, but upon one's vision of the
ultimate goal. All would agree that an intensification of racial and ethnic
identifications and loyalties to the point where coexistence is threatened
would be undesirable. Yet there is currently a good deal of disagreement
about whether social policy should aim toward a fully integrated society-at
the extreme, a society in which all racial and ethnic identity is lost-or a
multiethnic, multiracial society in which the lives of many individuals
would center upon their group identification. Adherents of one or another of
these positions (or of some intermediate view) are, one suspects, likely to
weigh the prospects of group. conflict very differently.
More fundamentally, these positions reflect differing views about the
desirable organization of society and the place of the individual in it. Movement toward a society organized along racial and ethnic lines may be seen as
posing a serious threat to concepts of individuality that-though they have
often been honored only in the breach-lie at the base of American beliefs
and institutions. The extent to which the society will move in that direction
will be primarily determined by forces other than those set in motion by preferential-admissions policies, but, given the importance of the universities in
contemporary America, the policies they pursue are likely to be a factor in
determining society's direction.
These considerations do not, in my judgment, disturb the earlier conclusion that the courts ought to reject a constitutional rule precluding legislatures from adopting racial and ethnic preferences. Balancing the dangers
of these preferences against their potential gains is a delicate, and ultimately
legislative, task. There is no warrant for the courts to draw the issue from the
political forum. The DeFunis case, however, did not on its facts require a
judgment about whether the courts should invalidate a legislative decision
sanctioning minority preferences, nor is it likely that the next case to reach
the Supreme Court will do so. Universities have adopted preferential-admissions policies without legislative sanction. The precise issue that is raised,
therefore, is not whether such policies are valid when adopted by a broadly
representative, politically responsible legislature, but whether they are valid
when adopted by a university.
Now it may be argued that the source of authority for minority preferences is not relevant to the question whether they should be held to violate the
equal-protection clause. The question whether law-school faculties are

Racial Preferences in Higher Education

261

authorized to adopt preferential-admissions policies is, on this view, solely
one of state law: the only federal question is whether the preferential policies
violate the equal-protection clause, and courts must answer the latter
question by proceeding as though the policies had been adopted by or received the express authorization of the legislature. It must be conceded that
this is the conventional view of the matter and that there is support for it in
Supreme Court decisions. The Court's decisions are, however, less clear on
the point than might be supposed. The Court has at times indicated that the
validity of action taken under the authority of the state may depend upon
whether the legislature has made a deliberate and focused judgment that
such action is an appropriate exercise of governmental power.
Although these decisions do not overrule the conventional view that the
constitutionality of action by a state must be determined without reference to
its source within the state, they are supported by more persuasive reasoning.
The latter view is based upon the premise that the federal Constitution does
not control the distribution of state legislative authority. The premise is
sound, but it does not support the conclusion drawn from it. The issue is not
whether state legislative authority can be delegated, but whether in determining the validity of state action that trenches upon constitutional values,
the courts ought to consider whether the judgment under review is that of the
legislature or of an agency that is less representative of the public and
lacking direct political responsibility.
Minimally, whether challenged state action rests upon a legislative judgment ought to be relevant to the degree of respect shown by the court to the
judgment. A commitment to democratic values requires considerable judicial
deference to deliberate legislative judgments, rather more in my view than
has been customary in recent years. But none of the reasons supporting
judicial deference to legislative judgment support equal deference to the
judgment of a police department or a law-school faculty. And only by
ignoring all that we know about legislative behavior could it be supposed that
a legislature's failure to limit the power of such bodies is equivalent to affirmative legislative approval of their decisions.
The notion that courts ought to respect all decisions taken under state
authority as though they were the product of the most careful legislative
deliberation, if consistently applied, would unnecessarily encroach upon
constitutional values. Courts would be required to sustain the constitutionality of governmental action that, because of the political safeguards of the
legislative process, might fail to receive legislative approval. Conversely, if
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judicial determinations of constitutionality are in reality influenced by an
agency's lack of political responsibility, the failure of constitutional doctrine
to acknowledge that fact candidly would lead to inappropriate restrictions on
legislative power: a decision that certain action is unconstitutional when
taken soley on the authority of a police officer will be taken to mean that
such action would be unconstitutional even if sanctioned by the legislature.
• . . The blithe references to "constitutional values" in the preceding
discussion ought not to obscure the fact that the values that receive constitutional protection change over time. Constitutional law evolves to reflect the
changing circumstances and values of our society. Few would wish it otherwise. Yet, after nearly two centuries' experience, thecourtshavenotsucceeded
in identifying sources of constitutional judgment that will, ••• "securely limit
as well as nourish it." This failure stems from the tension between the institutional mechanism that has developed for giving meaning to the Constitution-judicial review-and the democratic ideal that politically responsible institutions should determine the direction of governmental policy.
Quite possibly, that tension can never be completely eliminated. It might,
however, be substantially reduced by the development of doctrines that place
primary responsibility upon the legislature for making critical choices. When
such choices must be made, the effort ought to be to draw from the legislature, as the most broadly representative, politically responsible institution of
government, a focused judgment about the appropriate balance to be struck
between competing values. Once the legislature has made such a judgment,
courts ought to be extremely hesitant to upset it, for if the values to which law
gives expression are to change over time, the legislature's warrant for making
the necessary decisions is a good deal stronger than that of the courts. In the
absence of such a judgment, however, democratic values require invalidating
an exercise of state power that undermines values traditionally viewed as
fundamental. The cause of democracy is not served by allowing a subordinate
state agency to make such decisions.
These considerations frame the issues that are posed for the courts by
current policies of racial and ethnic preferences in university admissions.
There is no warrant for a judicially imposed rule foreclosing legislative
authorization of such policies. The difficult question is whether those policies
ought to be held to be within the competence of a university. If the analysis
advanced here were to be adopted by the courts, the judicial answer to that
question would only determine whether the proponents or opponents of
minority preferences would bear the burden of seeking legislative action.
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Ultimate authority over a critical issue of social policy would be consigned to
the legislature as the most broadly representative, politically responsible
institution of government. A judicial decision concerning the university's
authority would, nevertheless, have considerable significance. Although
neither proponents nor opponents of minority preferences lack the means to
force serious legislative consideration of the issue, the difficulty of obtaining
legislative action on so highly charged an issue would place the side bearing
that burden at an important disadvantage. The question for the courts is
which side ought to bear the burden.
The answer one gives to that question is likely to depend upon how one
reads our constitutional tradition with respect to racial and ethnic discrimination. If that tradition is understood to flow primarily from egalitarian
values, a concern that government ought not to contribute to the subjugation
of minorities, there is little reason to deny universities the power to adopt
preferential policies. Existing preferences seem likely to move the nation
toward the goal of racial and ethnic equality. Such preferences are likely to
be seen as contrary to constitutional tradition, however, if the tradition is
understood to be rooted primarily in an ethic of individualism, a belief that
each individual ought to be judged solely on his own merit. The difficulty, in
my view, is that neither alternative is entirely accurate. Our constitutional
tradition reflects both egalitarian and individualist values because, until
recently, the two seemed entirely compatible. Now, for the first time, it
appears (to many) that at least in the short run a choice may be required.
In the absence of a guiding constitutional tradition, I would conclude
that two arguments call for a decision sustaining the power of universities to
adopt preferential-admissions policies. The dispute over racial and ethnic
preferences involves a conflict between values of a very high order. Such conflicts are never fully resolved. The practical question is how far the society
will move in one direction or the other. Although the admissions policies of
universities are not a negligible factor in determining that direction,_ their
ultimate importance should not be overstated. There are many other points
of decision within the society, including private enterprise and other government agencies. Moreover, the system of higher education is itself highly
decentralized. When a value choice of such magnitude is posed, and
especially when the need for choice has only recently become apparent so that
its dimensions are not fully understood, there may be wisdom in allowing for
a period of decentralized decision-making. Universities have, in fact, responded to the demands for increased minority enrollments in a variety of
ways. Some have adopted racial and ethnic preferences. Others have adopted
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policies of preference for the disadvantaged without regard to racial and
ethnic background. Still others have adopted policies of "open enrollment."
Finally, some have maintained traditional "color-blind" standards. This
diversity of approaches may generate a better understanding of the issues,
permitting development of a consensus which is now lacking.
The most compelling reason for sustaining preferential-admissions
policies is that they offer hope of ameliorating the nation's most enduring
problem. The contrary arguments cannot be taken lightly; racial and ethnic
preferences do involve serious dangers. In the end, however, a decision concerning their validity cannot avoid a judgment about whether they are likely
to contribute to or retard development of the kind of society we want. In my
own judgment, for reasons already explained, the former is more likely. It
would be foolish to assert that judgment confidently, however. If the potential benefits are great, so too are the potential losses. But in the light of the
seriousness of America's racial problem, the risk seems worth taking, however uncomfortable we may be with it.
So speculative and personal a judgment is a weak foundation for judicial
interpretation of the Constitution. Yet, a contrary decision would necessarily
rest upon predictions that are equally conjectural and, therefore, equally
personal. If judges are uneasy about resting constitutional interpretation
upon such foundations, the remedy is not to fashion principles that mask the
underlying choices. The remedy, rather, is candidly to avow the choices that
must be made and to develop doctrines that consign ultimate authority for
those choices to the legislature, where in a democracy it rightly belongs.

